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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 960147-CA
Priority No. 2

TAMARA HOWARD
Defendant/Appellant,

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is from a final judgment and conviction for
Welfare Fraud, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-8-1201, et. seq. (1995 & Supp. 1996) (a copy of the
judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A ) , in the Third Judicial
District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the
Honorable William B. Bohling, presiding.

Jurisdiction is

conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (Supp. 1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issues presented for review are as follows:
1.

Whether the state's failure to present legally

sufficient evidence to establish that Tamara Howard ("Howard")
committed welfare fraud should have resulted in the dismissal of
the charge.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

A conviction will be reversed if the

evidence is sufficiently "inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
1

convicted."
2.

State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983).

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to submit to

the jury Howard's proposed instruction defining reasonable doubt.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

"Determining the propriety of a jury

instruction presents a question of law" which is reviewed nondeferentially for correctness.

State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362,

363 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); see also State v. Smoot, No. 950550
(Utah Ct. App. June 20, 1996).

Deficient reasonable doubt

instructions can never be harmless.

Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508

U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed. 2d 182 (1993).
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENT
After the state presented its case-in-chief, counsel for
Howard asked the trial court to dismiss the charge against Howard
on the basis that the state failed to present sufficient evidence
to support a conviction.

The trial court denied Howard's motion.

Record on Appeal ("R.") at 519-522.
In addition, during trial the defense requested that
Howard's proposed jury instruction defining the reasonable doubt
standard be submitted to the jury.

A copy of Howard's proposed

instruction is attached hereto as Addendum B.

(R. 157-58.)

The

trial court denied Howard's request and submitted its own
instruction defining the standard to the jury.

(R. 533-535.)

copy of the trial court's instructions is attached hereto as
Addendum C.

(R. 96.)

2

A

RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
The following statutes and constitutional provisions will be
determinative of the issues on appeal:
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1201, et. sea. (1995 & Supp.
1996) -- Public Assistance Fraud Act.
Utah Const, art. I, sec. 7.
U.S. Const, amend. V.
U.S. Const, amend. XIV.
The text of those provisions is contained in the attached
Addendum D.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and
Disposition in the Court Below.
Howard was charged by Information on June 19, 1995, with
Welfare Fraud, a second degree felony in violation of Utah Code
Ann. §§ 76-8-1201, et. seq. (1995 & Supp. 1996).

(R. 8-10.)

During the three-day jury trial, the trial court rejected a jury
instruction proposed by the defense, and at the conclusion of the
state's case, Howard's counsel made a motion to dismiss on the
basis that the state failed to present evidence sufficient to
support a conviction.

(R. 519-22.)

The trial court denied

Howard's motion, the jury found her guilty of welfare fraud, and
the trial court sentenced her to prison for an indeterminate term
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years.
80.)

(R. 179-

The trial court stayed the prison term and ordered Howard

by amended judgment to serve eight days in the county jail
followed by probation and to pay restitution. (Id.; 192-92.)
3

Howard appeals from the final judgment.

(R. 182-83.)

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The state presented evidence at trial that Howard applied
for welfare benefits on December 13, 1993.
Exhibit 1 (hereinafter "Ex. 1").)

(R. 290-295; State's

At that time, she completed an

application for financial assistance and indicated she wanted
more information on the "Self-Sufficiency" program.
Howard was unemployed.

(R. 607-08.)

(Ex. 1.)

Thus, at the time Howard

applied for benefits, the section on the application form
concerning employment was left blank.

(Ex. 1 at p. 6.)

On January 5, 1994, a case worker from the Utah Department
of Human Services (the "Department") discussed Howard's December
13 application with her.

(R. 295-97.)

The case worker testified

that she went over the employment section with Howard.

(R. 297.)

She also testified that when applicants inform her they have not
been working, she "put [s] a big red circle with a slash through
it" on the application.

(R. 297-98.)

Howard's December 13 application.

Such a mark was made on

(Ex. 1 at p. 6.)

The case

worker stated that she "would" have made that mark in response to
information she received from Howard; however, she could not
recall specifically how she discussed portions of the application
with Howard.

(R. 298; 328-29; Ex.1 at p. 6.)

The case worker also testified that while she and Howard
were reviewing forms, Howard "indicate[d] she wanted to find a
job."

(R. 298-99.)

That "indication" is reflected in the

December 13 application where Howard requested additional
4

information about the "Self-Sufficiency" program.
p.3.)

(Ex. 1 at

The case worker did not discuss employment opportunities

or services with Howard.
program.

Rather, she referred Howard to the

(R. 298-99.)

The application also contained "long and wordy" legal
provisions, which the case worker did not read to or review with
Howard.

(R. 301-05; 332-33.)

Howard's signature was at the

bottom of the application below a provision which stated that she
read or had the document read to her and understood the
statements and that the information provided in connection with
the application was true.

(R. 3 04-05; Ex. 1.)

During the application process, the case worker reviewed
with Howard approximately seven or eight forms, including a
"Changes You Must Report" form, which Howard signed.
327; State's Exhibit 3 (hereinafter "Ex. 3").)

(R. 310-12;

It required a

benefits recipient to report changes in income source and changes
of "more than $25 in gross income."

(Id.)

During the interview, Howard did not reveal anything to the
case worker about outside income or employment.

(R. 313.)

Howard's original case worker was assigned to her case for
approximately three months.

(R. 317-18.)

During that initial

three-month period, Howard's case worker handled approximately
130-140 additional and separate benefits cases.

(R. 318-19.)

a client wanted to reach one of ten case workers on the team,
he/she could leave a message on an answering machine, and a
supervisor in the office was supposed to post the message on a
5

If

regular slip of message paper for the appropriate case worker.
(R. 319-20.)
In March 1994, Howard's case was transferred to a second
case worker, who testified that she received a recertification
form ("Recertification Form") updating Howard's application
information.
4).)

(R. 349-352; State's Exhibit 4 (hereinafter "Ex.

One section of the Recertification Form asked whether

anyone in recipient's household had changed employment in the
past four months and the immediately succeeding section asked for
employment information.

(R. 3 52-53; Ex. 4 at pp. 4-5.)

sections were left blank on Howard's form.

Both

(Ex. 4 at pp. 4-5.)

The Recertification Form contained Howard's signature and was
dated March 1994.

(Ex. 4; R. 355.)

The second case worker also testified that in April 1994,
she received a Change Report Form indicating a change of
residence for Howard.
"Ex. 5").)

(R. 356-58; State's Exhibit 5 (hereinafter

Although the form requested changes in income of

"more than $25," no change was reported.

(R. 359-60; Ex. 5.)

The Change Report Form also contained a "fraud warning for food
stamp recipients."

(R. 361; Ex. 5 at p. 2.)

The second case worker admitted that the change form
documents were ambiguous with respect to what was required of
recipients in reporting changes in income.

(R. 3 72-75.)

Further, it was not clear whether the phrase, "more than $25,"
referred to income received per day, week, month, pay period, or
other.

(Id.) She also admitted that she never met with Howard,
6

and thus, never explained to Howard the Department's expectations
of recipients with respect to reporting changes in income.
369-70.)

(R.

The second case worker testified that she relied on the

representations set forth in the documents received in March and
April 1994 in making recommendations and calculations with
respect to the benefits provided to Howard.

(R. 362-63.)

In April 1994, Howard's file was transferred to another
Department office and a third case worker (R. 3 82-83), who
testified that most of her dealings with Howard were over the
telephone, but that she arranged to meet with Howard face-toface.

(R. 383-84; 387-88.)

Prior to the meeting, Howard tele-

phoned the case worker to state she recently had medical surgery
and was not feeling well.

(R. 387-88.)

Thus, the third case

worker sent a Recertification Form to Howard, which was returned
in December 1994 with Howard's signature.
Exhibit 6 (hereinafter "Ex. 6").)

(R. 385-86; State's

Again, the employment sec-

tions, as well as sections concerning physical and mental
disabilities and other sections, were left blank. (R. 389-90;
413-15; Ex. 6.)

The third case worker acknowledged that it was

not necessary for recipients to complete each section of the
Recertification Form, and in fact the case worker did not have an
expectation that the sections concerning physical disabilities or
medical expenses should be completed even though the case worker
was aware through her telephone conversations with Howard that
Howard was temporarily disabled as a result of a recent surgery.
(R. 413-15.)

The case worker also acknowledged that if there was
7

no change in employment, the recipient was not expected to
complete the employment sections of the Recertification Forms.
(R. 417-19.)
The third case worker testified that she was never informed
that Howard was employed, and relied on the representations set
forth in the Recertification Form and other application papers to
make determinations concerning benefits.

(R. 387.)

In December

1994, the third case worker learned through a routine computer
check that Howard had been employed since December 29, 1993.

(R.

404-09.)
In February 1995, Howard met the third case worker in person
and completed another Recertification Form.
Exhibit 6a.)
403; 419.)

(R. 3 93-94; State's

Howard indicated no change in employment. (R. 397All three case workers testified that even if a

benefits recipient is employed, he/she may still be eligible to
receive benefits.

(R. 325-26; 372-75; 419-20; 502-03.)

A Far West Consulting employee testified that Howard began
full-time employment with that company on December 29, 1993, as a
housekeeper and received wages for each pay period in 1994.
433-438; State's Exhibit 7.)

(R.

In addition, Howard's daughter was

employed with the company from April 1994 to December 1994.

(R.

447-49; State's Exhibit 7c.)
An employee from the Utah Bureau of Investigations and
Collections testified that he investigated allegations that
Howard engaged in welfare fraud.

(R. 460; 463.)

He outlined the

benefits provided to Howard from January 1994 to December 1994,
8

and testified that a computer calculated that she received
benefits overpayment during that period in the amount of
$11,092.64.

(R. 491.)

Witnesses for the defense testified that Howard suffers from
learning disabilities, is hearing impaired, needs assistance in
reading and completing forms and paper work, and is able to read
at a second or third grade level.
565; 588-89; 592-94; 602-04; 619.)

(R. 511; 513-14; 540; 552-58;
In addition, Howard testified

that during the 1993 Christmas-holiday season, she called and
left a message on the Department answering machine that she had
been hired to work at Far West for $4.25 per hour.
544-47.)

(R. 607-611;

Howard always believed that as a result of having made

that call, she sufficiently notified the Department of the
changes in her employment situation. (R. 613-15; 619-620.)
At the conclusion of trial, the jury was instructed as
follows:
Before you can convict the defendant, Tamara
Howard, of the crime of Welfare Fraud, a Second Degree
felony, you must find that the State has proven each of
the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. On or between January 1, 19 94, and December
31, 1994, the defendant, Tamara Howard, in Salt Lake
County, State of Utah;
2. knowingly or intentionally by false statement,
misrepresentation, impersonation, or other fraudulent
means;
3. failed to disclose any material fact or change
in circumstances;
4. for the purpose of obtaining or continuing to
receive public assistance to which she was not

9

entitled, or in an amount larger than that to which she
was entitled;
5. and the value of benefits fraudulently
obtained exceeded $5,000.00.
If you find that the evidence has failed to
establish each of [] these elements beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If you
find that the evidence has established each of these
elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the
defendant guilty.
(R. 103.)

In addition, over objections from the defense, the

trial court submitted to the jury a stock instruction defining
the reasonable doubt standard and rejected an instruction
proposed by the defense.

(R. 533-535.)

The jury found Howard guilty of welfare fraud.

(R. 81.)

The trial court sentenced her to prison (R. 179-80), then stayed
the prison term, and ordered Howard to serve eight days in the
county jail followed by probation and to pay restitution. (Id.;
192-93.)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The evidence presented at trial failed to show that Howard
had the requisite mental culpability to support the conviction.
The state presented evidence that the Department was unaware that
Howard was employed during the time she received benefits, and
documents submitted by Howard did not reflect the change in her
employment.

Those facts alone are insufficient to prove in-

tentional, knowing, or reckless conduct with an illegal purpose.
The reasonable doubt instruction used by the trial court was
circular and unhelpful, and trivialized the state's burden of
proof in violation of the due process clauses of the state and
10

federal constitutions.

On the other hand, the instruction offer-

ed by Howard was straight forward and clear.

The trial court

erred in refusing to submit Howard's instruction to the jury.
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE
SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF WELFARE FRAUD.
A.
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO SHOW THAT HOWARD
INTENTIONALLY, KNOWINGLY, OR RECKLESSLY FAILED TO
DISCLOSE A CHANGE IN EMPLOYMENT STATUS.
In this matter, the jury was charged with determining
whether the state had met its burden of proving the following
elements of welfare fraud beyond a reasonable doubt:

That Howard

"knowingly or intentionally by false statement, misrepresentation, impersonation, or other fraudulent means; [] failed to
disclose any material fact or change in circumstances; [] for the
purpose of obtaining or continuing to receive public assistance
to which she was not entitled, or in an amount larger than that
to which she was entitled."

(R. 103.J1

The marshalled evidence

reflects the following:

1
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1205 provides that a person is guilty of
public assistance fraud if she "intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
commits" any of the enumerated acts, including:

*

*

*

(3) . . . receives an unauthorized payment as a result
of acts described in this section;
(4) . . . receives benefits after failing to comply
with any applicable requirement in Section[] 76-8-1203 [which
requires disclosure of "each fact that may materially affect
the determination of [her] eligibility to receive public
assistance," including employment and income], . .; [and]
*

(11) . . . obtains
Section 76-8-1203 . . . .

*

*

an overpayment

11

by violation

of

When Howard prepared the December 13 application for
benefits, she was unemployed (R. 607-08);
When the first case worker reviewed the December 13
application and other forms with Howard in January
1994, Howard was employed but did not disclose that
fact to the case worker at that time (R. 297-305; 32829; 433-38);
Howard did not disclose in Recertification and change
forms any change in employment circumstances in 1994
while receiving welfare benefits (R. 352-58; 385-90;
413-15; Ex. 4; Ex. 5; Ex. 6 ) ;
Howard was required to report changes in income and
employment status to the Department (Utah Code Ann. §
76-8-1203 (1) (c) and (d) (1995)); and
The Department provided Howard with food stamps and
financial and medical benefits in 1994 based on a
representation that she was unemployed (R. 3 87; 3 6263) .
The evidence also reflects that once a recipient notifies the
Department of a change concerning employment, the recipient is
not required to "re"-notify the Department of such change in
succeeding Recertification Forms or change papers.

(R. 3 72-75;

413-19.)
In this case, Howard testified that prior to receiving
benefits from the Department and after completing the December 13
application, she left a telephone message on an answering machine
with the Department that she was employed and earning $4.25 per
hour.

(R. 607-11; 544-47.)

The state did not discredit Howard

with evidence that the supervisor, who would have been required
to post Howard's message, did not get the message.

In addition,

the state presented no evidence to support a determination that
Howard knew or should have known that the Department somehow did
not receive her message concerning the change in employment
12

status.
The state also failed to prove that Howard knew or should
have known she was receiving undeserved benefits, or that Howard
should have known the amount in benefits she was entitled to
receive at any given time.

Rather, the state's witnesses

testified that employed applicants may be eligible to receive
benefits.

(R. 325-26; 419-20; 502-03.)

Thus, it was reasonable

for Howard to believe that although she was employed, she was
entitled to the benefits she received.

Howard's conduct

constituted negligence at best and did not warrant a criminal
conviction.
The direct and circumstantial evidence and inferences
marshalled in favor of the verdict fail to show that Howard acted
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly and with an illegal
purpose.

(R. 103); Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1205 and 76-8-1203

(1995); see Palmer v. Commonwealth, 479 S.W.2d 613 (Ky. 1972)
(evidence of overpayment without more does not establish
inference of intent to commit welfare fraud); People v. Crawford,
422 N.Y.S.2d 540 (3d Dept. 1979); Holmes v. General Dynamics
Corp., 22 Cal.Rptr.2d 172, 179 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1993) (knowing
conduct is voluntary and intentional conduct, not mistake,
accident or some other innocent reason).
The court in People v. Johnson, 259 N.Y.S.2d 499 (1965),
reversed a conviction for welfare fraud for insufficient evidence
where the defendant was overpaid welfare assistance as a result
of earned income that she failed to report.
13

The court found that

the state failed to prove the defendant deliberately concealed a
material fact or obtained the assistance by means of a false
statement or representation.

Id.

If the state's evidence in this case -- that Howard received
benefits while she was employed, that the Department was unaware
that she was employed, and that Howard's employment was not
disclosed on the forms provided to the Department -- is
sufficient to support a conviction, the mental culpability
element of the offense, "intentionally, knowingly, recklessly,11
and with an illegal purpose, is effectively eliminated as an
ingredient of the offense.
and 76-8-1205 (1995).

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-8-1203(3)

Since the Public Assistance Fraud Act

requires the state to prove mental culpability, the conviction
against Howard must be reversed.
B.
THE EVIDENCE FAILED TO SHOW THAT HOWARD WAS
INELIGIBLE TO RECEIVE BENEFITS.
According to Section 76-8-1203, a recipient is in violation
of the Public Assistance Fraud Act if he or she fails to make a
disclosure that may materially affect "the determination of his
eligibility."

In this case, the state failed to present evidence

going to the eligibility factor.
While the state presented testimony from each case worker
that the Department workers believed Howard was unemployed when
they calculated the benefits she received, the state failed to
show how eligibility was determined, how Howard's budget was
established, and how it should have been adjusted to accommodate
14

reported wages.

In addition, during trial the state's witness,

Robert Riddle, testified that he entered various numbers into a
computer and the computer calculated the benefits and an
overpayment.

(R. 489-91.)

Riddle did not disclose how those

numbers related to such things as eligibility or how the benefits
were calculated.

Without such information the jury could not

have determined whether Howard was not entitled either to the
benefits she received or some other amount in benefits.

See

People v. Dixon, 46 Cal.App.3d 431, 120 Cal.Rptr. 163 (2d Dist.
1975) (evidence failed to establish that the defendant was
ineligible for the benefits).
ineligibility.

Thus, the state failed to prove

The conviction must be reversed on that basis.

POINT II. THE REASONABLE DOUBT INSTRUCTION USED BY THE
TRIAL COURT WAS CONFUSING AND CIRCULAR, AND IT
TRIVIALIZED THE BURDEN PLACED ON THE STATE.
Howard's counsel proposed a reasonable doubt instruction
that the trial court rejected.

(R. 157-58.)

Over Howard's

objection (R. 533-535), the trial court submitted the following
instruction to the jury:
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence,
are in favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed
innocence until he is proved guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. And in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an
acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon
the State to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt does
not require proof to an absolute certainty. Now by
reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is based on
reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a
doubt which is merely fanciful or imaginary or based on
a wholly speculative possibility. Proof beyond a
15

reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which
satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and
obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a
doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain,
and it must arise from the evidence or the lack of the
evidence in this case.
(R. 96 (hereinafter the trial court's jury instruction is
referred to as the "submitted instruction".)

This Court has

approved the use of an instruction identical to the submitted
instruction.

State v. Pedersen, 802 P.2d 1328 (Utah Ct. App.

1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 (Utah 1991); State v. Harrison,
805 P.2d 769 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 817 P.2d 327 (Utah
1991); State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),
reversed on other grounds, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993); State v.
Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Maestas, 815
P.2d 1319 (Utah Ct. App. 1991), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah
1991); State v. Gonzalez, 822 P.2d 1214 (Utah Ct. App. 1991);
State v. Brooks, 833 P.2d 362 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1992); State v.
Ontiveros, 835 P.2d 201 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Chavez,
840 P.2d 846 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert, denied, 857 P.2d 948
(Utah 1993).
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not ruled on the
sufficiency of the submitted instruction, it has shown interest
in general in reasonable doubt instructions.

In State v. Young,

853 P.2d 327, 346 (Utah 1993), the court found that a reasonable
doubt instruction similar to the instruction proposed by Howard
was sufficient.

The court sanctioned the use of language that

impressed upon the jury the heavy burden the prosecution must
16

meet to prove guilt: "You must have greater assurance of the
correctness of such a decision than you would normally have in
reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own life."
157-58); Id.

(See R.

That language is set forth in Howard's instruction

but did not occur in the submitted instruction.
The court also approved that portion of the instruction,
similar to the language in the instruction Howard proposed, that
informed jurors they were to "base their deliberations on the
evidence in the case and not to entertain imaginary or speculative suggestions."

Id.; but see State v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375

(Utah 1989) (the court in its supervisory capacity directed trial
courts to discontinue use of the "more weighty affairs of life"
language, and the "possible or imaginary" language).
While the Utah Supreme Court and the United States Supreme
Court have not condemned use of certain instructions, they have
indicated an inclination to review reasonable doubt instructions
with intense scrutiny, since use of certain words and phrases may
violate the due process provisions of the federal and state
constitutions.2

See Caere v. Lousiana, 489 U.S. 39, 111 S.Ct.

328, 112 L.Ed.2d 339 (1990) (per curiam) (the words "substantial"

2

The due process provisions of the federal constitution are
embodied in the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The fifth amendment
provides in part: "No person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law."
The fourteenth amendment
states in part: "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law." Article I, section 7 of the
Utah Constitution is identical to the federal provisions. Howard is not
asserting that a due process analysis under the Utah Constitution is
different from an analysis under the federal constitution. See State v.
Mace, 295 Adv. Rep. 44, 45 (Utah 1996).
17

and "grave" in an instruction may suggest a higher degree of
doubt than is required for acquittal under the reasonable doubt
standard in violation of the due process clause); Victor v.
Nebraska, 511 U.S.

, 114 S.Ct. 1239, 127 L.Ed.2d 583 (1994)

(Court condemned use of the phrase "moral certainty" and "moral
evidence" although it did not violate due process).
Against that backdrop, the sentence from the submitted
instruction, which reads: "Now by reasonable doubt is meant a
doubt that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view
of all the evidence," is circular and clarifies nothing.

It is

followed by the following sentence: "A reasonable doubt is a
doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain."

As

Justice Ginsburg complained in Victor, "Jury comprehension is
scarcely advanced when a court 'defines' reasonable doubt as
'doubt . . . that is reasonable.'"

114 S.Ct. at 1252, 127 L.Ed.

2d at 602 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in the judgment).
Another sentence of the submitted instruction states: "It
must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is merely
fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative
possibility."

Without more, that sentence is not helpful in

defining what "reasonable doubt" is.

Cf. Haston, 811 P.2d at 933

n. 5 ("It is doubtful that an effort to define the reasonable
doubt standard by telling a jury what it JLS not

would be

illuminating").
In total, after setting forth that the state must prove its

18

case beyond a reasonable doubt, the submitted instruction has
five sentences stressing what reasonable doubt is

not,

and

defining reasonable doubt in terms of "reason" and "reasonable"
people, thereby confusing and trivializing the burden placed on
the state.

The submitted instruction also suggests to the jurors

that they are being unreasonable if they have doubts.

The

submitted instruction trivializes the state's burden of proof in
violation of the due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth
amendments of the federal constitution and article I, section 7
of the Utah Constitution.

Deficient reasonable doubt

instructions can never be harmless error.

Sullivan v. Louisiana,

508 U.S. 275, 113 S.Ct. 2078, 124 L.Ed.2d 182 (1993).
On the other hand, the instruction proposed by Howard
identifies what reasonable doubt is without defining that phrase
in a circular fashion:
In some circumstances, the mere possibility that
the defendant did not commit the crime with which
he/she is charged may create a reasonable doubt;
however, any such possibility must be based upon reason
and logic, and not upon a purely emotional urge or a
wholly speculative possibility.
. . . . A determination that a defendant has committed
a crime beyond a reasonable doubt demands the
application of reason, impartiality and common sense.
You must have greater assurance of the correctness of
such a decision than you would normally have in
reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own life.
The reason for this standard is that you cannot undo
your verdict once you have announced it. In your
personal life, on the other hand, you may be able to
undo or modify the consequences or decisions you make.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest
standard of proof in the American system of justice; it
is the standard that is always used in criminal cases,
such as the case you will be deciding here. It is a
19

much higher standard of proof than the standards of
preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing
evidence used in civil cases. If a scale were used to
demonstrate the various standards of proof, with
complete uncertainty at one end of the scale and
absolute certainty at the other end, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt would be very close to the absolute
certainty end of the scale.
(R. 157-58.)

Howard's case should be reversed and remanded for a

new trial with a proper reasonable doubt instruction, as proposed
by the defense in this case.
CONCLUSION
Since the state failed to prove intentional, knowing, or
reckless conduct, and illegal purpose, Howard respectfully
requests the entry of an order reversing the conviction and
dismissing the case.

In the alternative, Howard requests an

order reversing the conviction and remanding the case for a new
trial with a proper reasonable doubt instruction.
SUBMITTED this

UJJL day of

^L^^c

JU^i

1996.

I/INDA M. JONES A
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

Lisa J. Remal
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

LISA J. REMAL (2722)
Attorney for Defendant
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOCIATION
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 532-5444

MAR 0 7 1996

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff,

AMENDED JUDGMENT,
SENTENCE (COMMITMENT)

:

v.

:

TAMARA HOWARD,

:

Defendant.

Case No. 951901594FS
JUDGE WILLIAM B. BOHLING

:

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the sentence in the aboveentitled case be amended as follows:
The above-named defendant, Tamara Howard, shall serve 8
(eight) days of jail as a condition of her sentence, in lieu of the
previous order of 9 (nine) days of jail.
All other conditions of the defendant's sentence as
contained in the Judgment, Sentence (Commitment) dated February 12,
1996 shall remain in effect.
DATED this

(

day of March, 1996.

CC'-HX

MAILED/DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing to MARK BAER at
the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. Wells Building, 160
East 300 South, Sixth Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84114 this ±
day of March, 1996.

TfarA.tLJ

0 0 0 f 9 :•

ADDENDUM B

INSTRUCTION NO.
A defendant is presumed innocent unless the defendant is
proved

guilty

beyond

a

reasonable

doubt.

Where

there

reasonable doubt, the defendant is entitled to an acquittal.

is

a

It is

the State's responsibility to prove the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable

doubt.

reasonable doubt.

The

State's

evidence

must

eliminate

all

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt, however, does

not require proof to an absolute certainty.
A reasonable doubt is a doubt which reasonable men and
women would entertain, and it must be based on the evidence or the
lack of evidence in the case.

In some circumstances, the mere

possibility that the defendant did not commit the crime with which
he/she is charged may create a reasonable doubt; however, any such
possibility must be based upon reason and logic, and not upon a
purely emotional urge or a wholly speculative possibility.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof
which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of those who
are bound

to act conscientiously

reasonable doubt.
a

crime beyond

upon

it, and eliminates

all

A determination that a defendant has committed

a reasonable

doubt demands the application

reason, impartiality and common sense.

of

You must have greater

assurance of the correctness of such a decision than you would
normally have in reaching the weighty decisions affecting your own
life.

The reason for this standard is that you cannot undo your

verdict once you have announced it.

In your personal life, on the

other hand, you may be able to undo or modify the consequences or
decisions you make.

Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is the highest standard
of proof in the American system of justice; it is the standard that
is always used in criminal cases, such as the case you will be
deciding here.

It is a much higher standard of proof than the

standards of preponderance of the evidence or clear and convincing
evidence used in civil cases. If a scale were used to demonstrate
the various standards of proof, with complete uncertainty at one
end of the scale and absolute certainty at the other end, proof
beyond a reasonable doubt would be very close to the absolute
certainty end of the scale.
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ADDENDUM C

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD

JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND FOR ™ 5 5 S J 5 ?
SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH

N0V 3

° 1995
Deputy Cferk

STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

VS.
TAMARA HOWARD,
Defendant

CASE NO: 951901594

THE JURY IS HEREBY CHARGED WITH THE LAW THAT
APPLIES TO THIS CASE IN THE FOLLOWING INSTRUCTIONS,
NUMBERED ([ ) THROUGH ££), INCLUSIVE.
Dated this

2& day of

November . 1995.
COURT:

WILLIAM B. BO
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

CP.CRI

n r
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INSTRUCTION NO. J

Members of the jury, I would like to thank you for your attention during
this trial. I will now explain to you the rules of law that you must follow and
apply in deciding this case. When I have finished you will go to the jury room
and begin your discussions, what we call your deliberations.

Please pay

attention to the legal instructions I am about to give you. This is an extremely
important part of this trial.
You are not to single out one instruction alone as stating the law, but
must consider the instructions as a whole. The order in which the instructions
are given has no significance as to their relative importance. If a direction or
an idea is stated more than once, or in varying ways, no emphasis is intended
and none must be inferred by you.

l.CRI

INSTRUCTION NO.

£L

The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are presented by
the allegations in the Information filed in this court and the defendant's plea
of "not guilty." This duty you should perform uninfluenced by pity for the
defendant or by passion or prejudice against him. You must not suffer
yourselves to be biased against the defendant because of the fact that he has
been arrested for this offense, or because he has been brought before the court
to stand trial. None of these facts is evidence of his guilt, and you are not
permitted to infer or to speculate from any or all of them that he is more
likely to be guilty than innocent.
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in this trial and
the law as stated to you by me. The law forbids you to be governed by mere
sentiment, conjecture, sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public
feeling. Both the State of Utah and the defendant have a right to demand and
they do demand and expect that you will conscientiously and dispassionately
consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the case, that you will
reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict may
be. The verdict must express the individual opinion of each juror.
2S.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

The defendant,

Tamara Howard,

is

accused

in

an

Information

filed with this Court by the Attorney General of the State of Utah
of having committed the crime of "Welfare Fraud," a felony of the
Second Degree, in violation of Section 62A-9-13 0, Utah Code
Annotated.

The essential allegations of the Information are as

follows:
That on or between January 1, 1994 and December 31, 1994, in
Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant Tamara Howard, as a
party to the offense, did intentionally, or knowingly by false
statement, misrepresentation, impersonation, or other fraudulent
means,

failed

to

disclose

any

material

fact

or

change

in

circumstances for the purpose of obtaining or continuing to receive
public assistance to which he was not entitled, or in an amount
larger than that to which he was entitled and the value of benefits
fraudulently obtained exceeded $5,000.

INSTRUCTION NO

.A

Instruction No. 3 is not to be considered by you as a statement of the
facts proved in this case, but is to be regarded by you merely as a summarized
statement of the allegations of the Information. The mere fact that the
defendant stands charged with an offense is not to be taken by you as any
evidence of his guilt.

4S.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO. O

You are instructed that to the Information the defendant has entered a
plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty denies each and all of the essential
allegations of the charge contained in the Information and casts upon the
State the burden of proving each and all of the essential allegations thereof to
your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt.

5S.CRI

flOA^

INSTRUCTION NO.

(o

You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has been
charged with this offense and has been held to answer to the charge by a
committing magistrate, is not any evidence of his guilt and is not even a
circumstance which should be considered by you in determining his guilt or
innocence.

6S.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

7

All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor of
innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he is proved guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a reasonable doubt as to whether
his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to an acquittal.
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State to prove the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt
does not require proof to an absolute certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is
meant a doubt that is based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of
all the evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative possibility.
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of proof which satisfies the
mind, convinces the understanding of those who are bound to act
conscientiously upon it and obviates all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt
is a doubt which reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must
arise from the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case.
8S.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

8

At times throughout the trial the court has been called upon to
determine whether certain offered evidence might properly be admitted. You
are not to be concerned with the reasons for such rulings and are not to draw
any inferences from them. Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a
question of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, the
court does not determine what weight should be given such evidence; nor does
it pass on the credibility of the witness. You are not to consider evidence
offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by the court; as to any
question to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection.

9.CR1
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INSTRUCTION NO.

6

Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in courts of justice,
upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether
favorable to the State or to the defendant, provided, however,that to support
a verdict of guilt the evidence, whether of one kind or the other or a
combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required by law.
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial.
The law makes no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof
required for conviction or as to their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but
respects each for such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a
reasonable method of proof.
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in question consists of
the testimony of every witness who, with any of his own physical senses,
perceived such conduct or any part thereof, and which testimony describes or
relates what thus was perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is
circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it shows any act,
statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove by
reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, it may be
considered by you in arriving at a verdict.
10.CR1
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10
Where there is a conflict in the evidence you should reconcile such
conflict as far as you reasonably can. But where the conflict cannot be
reconciled, you are the final judges and must determine from the evidence
what the facts are. There are no definite rules governing how you shall
determine the weight or convincing force of any evidence, or how you shall
determine what the facts in this case are. But you should carefully and
conscientiously consider and compare all of the testimony, and all of the facts
and circumstances, which have a bearing on any issue, and determine
therefrom what the facts are. You are not bound to believe all that the
witnesses have testified to or any witness or class of witnesses unless such
testimony is reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts and
circumstances in evidence. You may believe one witness as against many, or
many as against a fewer number in accordance with your honest convictions.
The testimony of a witness known to have made false statements on one matter
is naturally less convincing on other matters. So if you believe a witness has
wilfully testified falsely as to any material fact in this case, you may disregard
the whole of the testimony of such witness, or you may give it such weight as
you think it is entitled to.
ll.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

N

You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility
of the witnesses you have a right to take into consideration their bias, their
interest in the result of the suit, or any probable motive or lack thereof to
testify fairly, if any is shown. You may consider the witnesses' deportment
upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent
frankness or candor, or the want of it, their opportunity to know, their ability
to understand, and their capacity to remember. You should consider these
matters together with all of the other facts and circumstances which you may
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses'
statement.

12.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

l£

You are instructed that the defendant is a competent witness in the
defendant's own behalf and the defendant's testimony should be received and
given the same consideration as you give to that of any other witness. The
fact that the defendant stands accused of a crime is no evidence of defendant's
guilt and is no reason for rejecting defendant's testimony. However, you
should weigh the defendant's testimony the same as you weigh the testimony
of any other witness.

13S.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

1J

The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of
a witness to be received as evidence.

An exception to this rule

exists in the case of a witness who, by education, study and
experience has become an expert in any art, science or profession.
Such a witness may give his opinion on any matter in which he has
been deemed to be an expert and which is material to the case. You
should consider such expert opinion and the basis and reasons, if
any, given for it, and then give it the weight to which you feel it
is entitled.

You are not bound by such an opinion and you may

reject it, if in your judgment, the basis and reasons given for it
are unsound.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

1 1

Before you can convict the defendant, Tamara Howard, of
the crime of Welfare Fraud, a Second Degree felony, you must find
that the State has proven each of the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt:
1. On or between January 1, 1994, and December 31, 1994,
the defendant, Tamara Howard, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah;
2.

knowingly or intentionally by false statement,

misrepresentation, impersonation, or other fraudulent means;
3.

failed to disclose any material fact or change in

circumstances;
4. for the purpose of obtaining or continuing to receive
public assistance to which she was not entitled, or in an amount
larger than that to which she was entitled;
5.

and the value of benefits fraudulently obtained

exceeded $5,000.00.
If you find that the evidence has failed to establish
each of the these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find
the defendant not guilty.

If you find that the evidence has

established each of these elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the defendant guilty.

o o o i o r-

INSTRUCTION NO.

\<?

In the alternative, you can convict the defendant Tamara
Howard of Attempted Welfare Fraud.
Before you can convict the defendant, Tamara Howard, of the
lesser included crime of Attempted Welfare Fraud, a Third Degree
Felony, you must find that the State has proven that the defendant,
acting with the culpability otherwise required for the commission
of the offense of Welfare Fraud, engaged in conduct consisting of
a substantial step toward the commission of the offense of Welfare
Fraud. You must find that the State has proven that the defendant
did so attempt to commit Welfare Fraud with respect to each of the
elements of Welfare Fraud as enumerated in Instruction No.

14

For purposes of the offense of Attempted Welfare Fraud,
conduct does not constitute a substantial step unless it is
strongly corroborative of the defendant's intent to commit the
offense.
If you find that the evidence has failed to establish each of
the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant
not guilty.

If you find that the evidence has established each of

the elements beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant
guilty.

I Jo

INSTRUCTION NO.

Our State Legislature has provided in our criminal code as it
applies to this case that no person is guilty of an offense unless
her conduct is prohibited by law and that person acts intentionally
or knowingly with respect to each element of the offense.
It is thus apparent that the law requires a culpable mental
state and to determine whether a person acts with the required
mental intent requires a jury to examine and consider the actor's
conduct.

In doing

so you must consider the nature of

one's

conduct, the circumstances surrounding her conduct and the result
of her conduct.
Considering

these

factors, our

law

states

that

a

person

engages in conduct:
(1)

Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect

to the nature of her conduct or to a result of her conduct, when it
is her conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or
cause the result.
(2)

Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to her conduct

or to circumstances surrounding her conduct when she is aware of
the nature of her conduct or the existing circumstances.

A person

acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of her
conduct when she is aware that her conduct is reasonably certain to
cause the result.

INSTRUCTION NO.

(H

A person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if, acting
with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission
of the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial
step

toward

the

commission

of

the

offense.

Conduct

only

constitutes a substantial step if there is evidence which strongly
corroborates the defendant's intent to commit the offense of
welfare fraud.
In this case, the defendant Tamara Howard, can be found to
have committed the lesser included offense of Attempted Welfare
Fraud if you find that on or between January 1, 1994 and December
31, 1994r in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant Tamara
Howard, as a party to the offense, intentionally or knowingly, by
false

statement,

misrepresentation,

impersonation,

or

other

fraudulent means, failed to disclose any material fact or change in
circumstances for the purpose of attempting to obtain or attempting
to continue to receive public assistance to which he was not
entitled, or in an amount larger than that to which he was entitled
and the value of benefits fraudulently obtained or attempted to be
obtained exceeded $5,000.
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INSTRUCTION NO.

1U

You are instructed that a paid state warrant or check made to
the order of the defendant, is sufficient to establish that the
defendant received public assistance in the amount of the warrant
or check.

Such evidence may be rebutted or contradicted, but in

the absence of evidence to rebut or contradict it, the warrant or
check will suffice as proof that the defendant

received the

assistance.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
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An act committed or an omission made under an ignorance or
mistake of fact which disproves the culpable mental state is a
defense for that crime.
Thus a person is not guilty of a crime if she commits an act
or omits to act under an honest and reasonable belief in the
existence of certain facts and circumstances which, if true, would
make such act or omission lawful.

ooolo*

INSTRUCTION NO.

In determining any fact in this case you should not consider nor be
influenced by any statement made or act done by the court which you may
interpret as indicating its views thereon. You are the sole and final judges of
all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe the court
thinks thereon. The court has not intended to express, or intimate, or be
understood as giving any opinion on what the proof shows or does not show,
or what are or what are not the facts in the case. And it is immaterial what
the court thinks thereon.

You must follow your own views and not be

influenced by the views of the court.

16.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO. 2 1

The lawyers, like you and myself, are officers of this Court. It is the duty
of each of them to present the evidence on behalf of the client and to make
such objections as he or she deems proper and to argue fully the client's cause.
You should, however, bear in mind that each of the lawyers is here in a
partisan capacity, and it is both their duty and responsibility to be advocates
of the position he or she claims for the client. If during the trial or in their
closing arguments, the lawyers have made statements concerning the evidence
which do not conform with your recollection of it, you should disregard the
lawyers' statements and rely solely on your own recollection of the evidence.
If either lawyer's argument includes statements of the law which differ from
the law which I have given you, you should disregard such statements and rely
entirely on the law as given to you by the Court.

17S.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

In arriving at a verdict in this case, you shall not discuss or consider the
subject of penalty or punishment. That is a matter which lies with the Court
and other governmental agencies, and must not in any way affect your decision
as to the innocence or guilt of a defendant.

18.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

The court has endeavored to give you instructions embodying all rules
of law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict.
The applicability of some of these instructions will depend upon the
conclusions you reach as to what the facts are. As to any such instruction, the
fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion of the
court and that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If
an instruction applies only to a state of facts which you find does not exist, you
will disregard the instruction.

19.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

Q^

The State of Utah and the defendant both are entitled to the individual
opinion of each juror. It is the duty of each of you after considering all the
evidence in the case, to determine, if possible, the question of guilt or
innocence of the defendant. When you have reached a conclusion in that
respect, you should not change it merely because one or more or all of the
other jurors may have come to a different conclusion. However, each juror
should freely and fairly discuss with the other jurors the evidence and the
deductions to be drawn from the evidence. If, after doing so, any juror
should be satisfied that a conclusion the juror first reached was wrong, the
juror unhesitatingly should abandon that original opinion and render the
juror's verdict according to the juror's final decision.

20S.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO.

The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of their deliberations
are a matter of considerable importance. It is rarely productive of good for
a juror, upon entering the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of the
juror's opinion on the case or to announce a determination to stand for a
certain verdict. When one does that at the outset, the juror's sense of pride
may be aroused, and the juror may hesitate to recede from an announced
position if shown that it is fallacious. Remember that you are not partisans
or advocates in this matter, but are judges. The final test of the quality of
your service will lie in the verdict which you return to the court, not in the
opinions any of you may hold as you retire. Have in mind that you will make
a definite contribution to efficient judicial administration if you arrive at a
just and proper verdict. To that end, the court would remind you that in
your deliberations in the jury room there can be no triumph excepting the
ascertainment and declaration of the truth and the administration of justice
based on such declaration.

21.CRI
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INSTRUCTION NO. &
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will
preside over your deliberations.

Your verdict in this case on the

charge of Welfare Fraud, must be either:
1.

Guilty of Welfare Fraud, a Second Degree Felony,

or;
Guilty of Attempted Welfare Fraud, a Third Degree Felony,
or;
3.

Not Guilty of Welfare Fraud or Attempted Welfare Fraud.

This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all
jurors is required to find a verdict.

A written form for each of

the above-mentioned possible verdicts will be furnished to you.
When your verdict has been found, the appropriate form or forms
must be signed and dated by your foreperson and then returned by
you to this court.

When your verdict has been found, notify the

Bailiff that you are ready to report to the court.
DATED this

day of

November

, 199JL

( IVT^k
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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ADDENDUM D

PART 12
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD
76-8-1201. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Overpayment" means the same as that term is defined in Section
62A-9-129.
(2) "Provider" means the same as that term is defined in Section
62A-11-103.
(3) "Public assistance" means the same as that term is defined in
Section 62A-11-103.
(4) "Recipient" means a person who receives or has received public
assistance.
History: C. 1953,76-8-1201, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 122, § 8.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122,
§ 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 79 Am. Jur. 2d Welfare Laws
§§ 111 to 113.
AJLR. — Criminal liability under state laws
in connection with application for, or receipt of,

public welfare benefits, 22 A.L.R.4th 534.
Liability of state or federal government for
losses associated with distribution of food
stamps, 116 A.L.R. Fed. 457.

76-8-1202. Application of part.
(1) This part does not apply to offenses by providers under the state's
Medicaid program that are actionable under Title 26, Chapter 20, False Claims
Act.
(2) (a) Section 62A-9-131 applies to criminal actions taken under this part,
(b) The repayment of funds or other benefits obtained in violation of the
provisions of this chapter shall not constitute a defense or grounds for
dismissal of a criminal action.
History: C. 1953,76-8-1202, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 122, § 9.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122,
§ 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994.

76-8-1203. Disclosure required — Penalty,
(1) Each person who applies for public assistance shall disclose to the
Department of Human Services each fact that may materially affect the
determination of his eligibility to receive public assistance, including his
current:
(a) marital status;
(b) household composition;

(c) employment;
(d) income;
(e) receipt of monetary and in-kind gifts; and
(f) other resources.
(2) Any person applying for public assistance who intentionally, knowingly,
or recklessly fails to disclose any material fact required to be disclosed under
Subsection (1) is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(3) Any recipient who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to disclose
to the Department of Human Services any change in a material fact required
to be disclosed under Subsection (1), within ten days after the date of the
change, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if that failure to disclose results in
an overpayment.
History: C. 1953,76-8-1203, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 122, § 10.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122,
§ 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994.

76-8-1204. Disclosure by provider required — Penalty.
(1) (a) Any provider who solicits, requests, or receives, actually or constructively, any payment or contribution through a payment, assessment, gift,
devise, bequest, or other means, directly or indirectly, from a recipient or
recipient's family shall notify the Department of Human Services of the
amount of payment or contribution in writing within ten days after
receiving that payment or contribution.
(b) If the payment or contribution is to be made under an agreement,
written or oral, the provider shall notify the Department of Human
Services of the payment or contribution within ten days after entering into
the agreement.
(2) Any person who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly fails to notify the
Department of Human Services as required by this section is guilty of a class
B misdemeanor.
History: C. 1953,76-8-1204, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 122, § 11.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122,
§ 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994.

76-8-1205. Public assistance fraud defined.
Each of the following persons, who intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly
commits any of the following acts, is guilty of public assistance fraud:
(1) any person who uses, transfers, acquires, traffics in, falsifies, or
possesses any food stamp, food stamp identification card, certificate of
eligibility for medical services, Medicaid identification card, or public
assistance warrant in a manner not allowed by law;
(2) any person who fraudulently misappropriates any funds exchanged
for food stamps, any food stamp, food stamp identification card, certificate
of eligibility for medical services, Medicaid identification card, or other
public assistance with which he has been entrusted or that has come into
his possession in connection with his duties in administering any state or
federally funded public assistance program;
(3) any person who receives an unauthorized payment as a result of acts
described in this section;

(4) any provider who receives payment or any recipient who receives
benefits after failing to comply with any applicable requirement in
Sections 76-8-1203 and 76-8-1204;
(5) any provider who files a claim for payment under any state or
federally fiinded public assistance program for goods or services not
provided to or for a recipient of that program;
(6) any provider who files or falsifies a claim, report, or document
required by state or federal law, rule, or provider agreement for goods or
services not authorized under the state or federally funded public assistance program for which the goods or services were provided;
(7) any provider who fails to credit the state for payments received from
other sources;
(8) any provider who bills a recipient or a recipient's family for goods or
services not provided, or bills in an amount greater than allowed by law or
rule;
(9) any recipient who, while receiving public assistance, acquires income or resources in excess of the amount he previously reported to the
Department of Human Services, and fails to notify the department within
ten days after acquiring the excess income or resources;
(10) any person who fails to act as required under Section 76-8-1203 or
76-8-1204 with intent to obtain or help another obtain an "overpayment*
as defined in Section 62A-9-129; and
(11) any person who obtains an overpayment by violation of Section
76-8-1203 or 76-8-1204.
History: C. 1953,76-8-1205, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 122, § 12.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122,
§ 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994.

76-8-1206. Penalties for public assistance fraud.
(1) The severity of the offense of public assistance fraud is classified in
accordance with the value of payments, assistance, or other benefits received,
misappropriated, claimed, or applied for as follows:
(a) second degree felony if the value exceeds $1,000;
(b) third degree felony if the value exceeds $250 or is up to $1,000;
(c) class A misdemeanor if the value exceeds $100 or is up to $250; and
(d) class B misdemeanor if the value is $100 or less.
(2) For purposes of Subsection (1), the value of an offense is calculated by
aggregating the values of each instance of public assistance fraud committed
by the defendant as part of the same facts and circumstances or a related series
of facts and circumstances.
(3) Incidents of trafficking in food stamps that occur within a six-month
period, committed by an individual or coconspirators, are deemed to be a
related series of facts and circumstances regardless of whether the transactions are conducted with a variety of unrelated parties.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-1206, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 122, § 13.

Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 122,
§ 16 makes the act effective on March 16,1994.

76-8-1207. Legal actions — Evidence — Value of benefits
— Repayment no defense to criminal action.
In any criminal action pursuant to this part:
(1) a paid state warrant made to the order of a party constitutes prima
facie evidence that the party received financial assistance from the state;
(2) all of the records in the custody of the department relating to the
application for, verification of, issuance of, receipt of, and use of public
assistance constitute records of regularly conducted activity within the
meaning of the exceptions to the hearsay rule of evidence;
(3) the value of the benefits received shall be based on the ordinary or
usual charge for similar benefits in the private sector; and
(4) the repayment of funds or other benefits obtained in violation of the
provisions of this part constitutes no defense to, or ground for dismissal of,
that action.
History: C. 1953,76-8-1207, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 102, § 1.
Effective Dates. — Laws 1994, ch. 102

became effective on May 2, 1994, pursuant to
Utah Const, Art. VI, Sec. 25.

PART 12
PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FRAUD
76-8-1206. Penalties for public assistance fraud.
(1) The severity of the offense of public assistance fraud is classified in
accordance with the value of payments, assistance, or other benefits received,
misappropriated, claimed, or applied for as follows:
(a) second degree felony if the value is or exceeds $5,000;
(b) third degree felony if the value is or exceeds $1,000 but is less than
$5,000;
(c) class A misdemeanor if the value is or exceeds $300 but is less than
$1,000; and
(d) class B misdemeanor if the value is less than $300.
(2) For purposes of Subsection (1), the value of an offense is calculated by
aggregating the values of each instance of public assistance fraud committed
by the defendant as part of the same facts and circumstances or a related series
of facts and circumstances.
(3) Incidents of trafficking in food stamps that occur within a six-month
period, committed by an individual or coconspirators, are deemed to be a
related series of facts and circumstances regardless of whether the transactions are conducted with a variety of unrelated parties.
History: C. 1953, 76-8-1206, enacted by L.
1994, ch. 122, 9 13; 1995, ch. 291, § 22.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 1995, increased the
value amounts in Subsections (lXa) through
(d).

Art I

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH

Sec. 7. [Due process of law.]
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

AMENDMENT V
[Criminal actions — Provisions concerning — Due process
of law and just compensation clauses.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases
arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in
time of War or public danger, nor shall any person be subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty,
or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation.

AMENDMENT XIV
Section
1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
3. [Disqualification to hold office.]

Section
4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of
the Confederacy and claims not
to be paid.]
5. [Power to enforce amendment.]

Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal
protection.]
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appointment.]
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States,
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.]
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such
disability.

Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.]
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law,
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any
claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations,
and claims shall be held illegal and void.

Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment]
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.

